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Zoning And The Vested Right To Use Property;
There ought to be a right!
INTRODUCTION
It would seem that ownership of real property subject to an ex-
istent comprehensive zoning plan would create an interest for the
owner in the use of his property. But, there is a substantial conflict
between the government's power to take or damage private prop-
erty for public use (the power of eminent domain) and the govern-
ment's power to regulate the use of property (the police power).
These powers exist at all levels of government, including state,
county and municipal, and have a constitutional basis in California.1
The fundamental distinction between them is that the exercise of
eminent domain power requires compensation to the owner, while
the exercise of the police power does not. The individual property
owner should know when the exercise of government power re-
quires compensation. The answer, however is not clear, nor does
it seem fair.
The enactment of the California Government Code § 658602 which
1. Cal. Const. Art. 1, § 14 (West 1969). Eminent Domain; etc.
Sec. 14. Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation having first been made to, or paid
into court for, the owner ...(Amended Oct. 10, 1911; Nov. 5, 1918; Nov. 6, 1928; Nov. 6, 1934)
Cal. Const. Art. 11 § 7 (West 1973) Counties and cities; ordinances and
regulations; authority
Sec. 7. A county may make and enforce within its limits
all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not
in conflict with general laws.(Added June 2, 1970)
2. Cal. Gov. Code § 65860. (West 1973) Consistency of zoning ordi-
nances with general plan; actions to enforce compliance; Amendments.
(a) County and city zoning shall be consistent with the general
plan of the county or city by * * * January 1, 1974. A zoning
ordinance shall be consistent with a city or county general plan
bnly if:(i) the city or county has officially adopted such a plan, and(ii) the various land uses authorized by the ordinance are com-
patible with the objectives, policies, general land uses, and pro-
grams in such a plan.(b) Any resident or property owner within a city or a county, as
the case may be, may bring an action in the superior court to en-
force compliance with the provisions of subdivision (a). ...
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requires that all zoning laws be consistent with the general plan
of a community, the adoption of California Government Code §§
65553 to 655703 which requires governments to plan for open space
lands, the adoption of the California Coastal Zone Conservation
Commission Act of 19724 which creates commissions to protect the
environment within 1,000 yards of the California coastline, the en-
actment of the California Environmental Quality Act, which re-
quires environmental impact reports in order to gain a building per-
mit, and the general sentiment of the people of this state against
future growth in local communities has caused a re-evaluation of
planning and zoning throughout the state. This re-evaluation has
and will cause a severe reduction in the permissible uses of private
property under various municipal, county, and state plans. While
the majority of the people favor new government planning and
rezoning, those property owners who are going to be seriously af-
fected by the government's exercise of power may suffer great
hardship and severe pocketbook losses from the restricting of the
use of their property. The power to zone, rezone, and "down-zone"
(the reduction of permissible use of property by changing its use
or decreasing the use per unit area) is pervasive. The conflicting
interests of the owner and the government are both financial. The
owner wants compensation for the loss of the use of his property.
The government wants to restrict property uses at the lowest cost
to the taxpayers.
There would seem to be a fundamental definitional distinction
between taking or damaging property or property interests, and
regulation of the method and manner in which property is used.
By statute taking or damaging is limited to property which is "for
a more necessary public use than that to which it has already been
appropriated."0 Regulation is limited to that which restricts use
"to promote the public morals, health, safety, or general welfare. '7
But consider the way that distinction was described in 1960 by a
(c) In the event that a zoning ordinance becomes inconsistent
with a general plan, such zoning ordinance shall be amended within
a reasonable time so that it is consistent with the general plan as
amended.
(Amended by Stats. 1970, c. 1590 p. 3314, § 12; Stats. 1971 c. 1446, p. 2858,
§ 12; Stats. 1972, c. 639, p. 1190, § 2, urgency, eff. Aug. 9, 1972; 1973, c. 120,
p. 150, §§ 6 and 7, urgency, eff. June 29, 1973, operative Jan. 1, 1974)
3. Cal. Gov. Code §§ 65553-65570. (West 1973)
4. Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 27000-27650 (West 1973). (Added by Initia-
tive Measure approved by the electors November 7, 1972).
5. Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 21000 et seq. (West 1974).
6. Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 1240(3) (West 1972).
7. Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 447, 488, 234 P. 381, 385,
(1925), error dismissed 273 U.S. 781 (1925).
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District Court of Appeal in California:
... the fundamental distinction between eminent domain and the
police power is recognized ... The determination depends on
whether or not the action is essential or reasonably necessary to
safeguard public health, safety, or morals. If the injury is a result
of legitimate governmental action reasonably taken for the public
good and for no other purpose, and is reasonably necessary to serve
a public purpose for the general welfare, it is a proper exercise of
the police power to permit the taking or damaging of private prop-
erty without compensation. If, however, the taking or damaging
for the purposes of public health, safety, or morals is not so essen-
tial to the general welfare or is not prompted by so great a neces-
sity, it comes within the purview of eminent domain and cannot
be justified without proper compensation to the owner.8
This distinction is based on the necessity of the exercise of govern-
ment power and would define regulation as that taking or damaging
which is reasonably necessary or essential. It cannot be said that
this case stands for the rule of law in its present status. It is an
example of how far afield the courts have gone in defining the
power to regulate." It further implies that there is something to
be taken by the use of the police power.
Since 1926 when the U.S. Supreme Court upheld comprehensive
zoning regulations as constitutional in Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co.,10 the power of regulation has expanded at a frightening
rate. To avoid the taking arguments before the courts, they have
stripped the property owner of his bundle of rights that make up
real property ownership. A basic incident to real property owner-
ship is that the owner has a right to use his property. However,
the courts have evolved a theory of vested rights, which defines
the right to use property as only existing when it is in fact used
and that right is limited to the extent of that use in fact.
In the conflict between the power of eminent domain and the
police power, the emphasis on the side of the police power has been
to expand the validity and scope of government power. On the
side of eminent domain, the emphasis has been upon shrinking of
property rights to avoid the possibility of taking or damaging. Ex-
8. Hunter v. Adams, 180 Cal.App. 2d 511, 523, 4 Cal.Rptr. 776, 784(1960).
9. Arguably under this rule a lot could be appropriated in fee for a
school, highway, courthouse, or whatever if found essential and reasonably
necessary.
10. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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amine how the trends in evolution of this conflict have fared
in the courts.
THE CONFLICT
a) The Scope and Validity of Zoning Power
The power to zone and regulate the use of property is spelled
out in the California Government Code § 65850:11
Scope of power to regulate by ordinance. Pursuant to the provi-
sions of this chapter, the legislative body of any county or city by
ordinance may:
(a) Regulate the use of buildings, structures and land as between
***industry, business, residents, open space, including agriculture,
recreation, enjoyment of scenic beauty and use of natural resources,
and other purposes.
(b) Regulate signs and billboards.
(c) Regulate location, height, bulk, number of stories and size and
use of lots, yards, courts, and other open spaces; the percentage of
a lot which may be occupied by a building or structure, the inten-
sity of land use.
(d) Establish requirements for offstreet parking and loading.
(e) Establish and maintain building setback lines.
(f) Create civic districts around civic centers, public parks, pub-
lic buildings or public grounds and establish regulations therefor.
It should be noted that regulate is the key word throughout the
statute. But the scope of that regulation is determined by local
government legislative entities, and is conclusive 12 unless the owner
can show that the ordinance is unreasonable,' 3 arbitrary,14 discrim-
inatory, 15 oppressive,'0 confiscatory, 7 or interferes with property
rights.'8 All these factors make up the general test of the reason-
11. Cal. Gov. Code § 65850 (West 1974).
12. Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 29 Cal.2d 332, 175 P.2d 542
(1947), Cow Hollow Improvement Club v. DiBene, 245 Cal.App. 2d 160,
53 Cal.Rptr. 610 (1966).
13. Hamer v. Town of Ross, 59 Cal.2d 776, 382 P.2d 375, 31 Cal.Rptr.
335 (1963).
14. Lockhard v. Los Angeles, 33 Cal.2d 453, 202 P.2d 38 (1949), cert.
denied 337 U.S. 939 (1949); Hopkins v. McCulloch, 35 Cal.App.2d 442, 95
P.2d 950 (1939).
15. Griffin v. County of Marin, 157 Cal.App.2d 507, 321 P.2d 148 (1958),
Jones v. City of Los Angeles 211 Cal. 304, 295 P. 14 (1931), G. & D. Hol-
land Construction Co. v. City of Marysville, 12 Cal.App.3d 989, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 227 (3d Dist.) (1970).
16. Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal. 2d 826, 323 P.2d 91 (1958).
17. Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles, 161 Cal.App.2d 454, 327 P.2d 10
(1958).
18. Corp. Presiding Bishop v. City of Porterville, 90 Cal.App.2d 656,
202 P.2d 823 (1949), Skalko v. City of Sunnyvale, 14 Cal. 2d 213, 93 P.2d
93 (1939), Sneed v. County of Riverside, 218 Cal.App.2d 205, 32 Cal.Rptr.
318 (1963).
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ableness of the regulation, but the scales are weighted heavily in
favor of the government's determination. "If the validity of the
legislative classification be fairly debatable, the legislative judg-
ment must be allowed to control."'19 ". . . [M]unicipalities,
through their legislative bodies should be permitted to establish
zoning controls without judicial interference except in the case of
arbitrary action, oppression, or confiscation. '20
In treating the scope of police power the U.S. Supreme Court
said in Hadacheck v. Sebastian,21
It is to be remembered that we are dealing with one of the most
essential powers of government, -- one that is least limitable. It
may, indeed, seem harsh in its exercise, usually is on some individ-
ual, but the imperative necessity for its existence precludes any
limitation upon it when not exerted arbitrarily. A vested interest
cannot be asserted against it because of conditions once obtain-
ing.2 2
Consider the statement in Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 23 "The
fact that . . . zoning of petitioner's property .. . depreciates its
value is not of controlling significance. Every exercise of the police
power is apt to effect adversely the property interest of some-
body. '24 Thus the courts have permitted legislative determinations
to cripple the property owner economically through the use of the
police power.
But the power is not unlimited. "Discontinuance forthwith of
a non-conforming use which is not a nuisance and which existed
when the ordinance was adopted is a deprivation of property with-
out due process of law. '25
In Willkins v. City of San Bernardino26 where the plaintiff de-
liberately and willfully built multiple dwelling units on property
zoned for single family units, his action was upheld by the trial
court because "it would be impractical to use them for single fam-
19. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 386 (1926).
20. Hamer v. Town of Ross, 59 Cal.2d 776, 791-2, 382 P.2d 375, 385, 31
Cal. Rptr. 335, 345 (1963).
21. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
22. Id. at 410.
23. 195 Cal. 497, 234 P. 388 (1925), aff'd. 274 U.S. 325 (1926).
24. Id. at 512, 234 P.2d at 394.
25. City of Los Altos v. Silvey, 206 Cal.App.2d 606, 609, 24 Cal. Rptr.
200, 202 (1962); see also McCaslin v. Monterey Park, 163 Cal.App.2d 339,
329 P.2d 522 (1958).
26. 29 Cal. 2d 332, 175 P.2d 542 (1946).
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ily dwellings."2  The trial court was reversed by the California
Supreme Court which held, "we cannot say that there was any
abuse of legislative discretion in denying plaintiff's requests for re-
zoning, or that there has been any arbitrary, oppressive or unrea-
sonable application of the zoning ordinance to plaintiff's property
" . .,,28 The court did note the restraints on the police power as
exercised through zoning,
... [Zloning ordinances have been held invalid and unreason-
able as applied to particular property .. .: 1. Where the zoning
ordinance attempts to exclude and prohibit existing and estab-
lished uses or businesses that are not nuisances. [citations omitted]
2. Where the restrictions create a monopoly. [citations omitted]
3. Where the use of adjacent property renders the land en-
tirely unsuited to or unusable for the only purpose permitted by
the ordinance. [citations omitted]. 4. Where a small parcel is
restricted and given less rights than the surrounding property, as
where a lot in the center of a business or commercial district is lim-
ited to use for residential purposes, thereby creating an "island" in
the middle of a larger area devoted to other uses, [citations
omitted] .29
However these restraints are difficult to prove in light of the pre-
sumption against them.
Every intendment is in favor of the validity of the exercise of po-
lice power, and, even though a court might differ from the deter-
mination of the legislative body, if there be any reasonable basis
for the 'belief that the establishment of a strictly residential dis-
trict has substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals
or general welfare, the zoning measure will be deemed to be with-
in the purview of the police power.3 0
The burden on the deprived owner is tremendous in asserting his
claim against the government for rezoning his property. The test
seems to be that if the government asserts any justification that
is not totally irrational and illogical, it may regulate the use of
realty with its police power. Under such a test the regulation of
property is limited only by the illogic of local government officials
and the whims of the voters.31 The use of property is not entrusted
to very safe hands.
Of course, the owner of property who is injured as a result of
rezoning of his property must be accorded notice82 and a hearing83
27. Id. at 341, 175 P.2d at 548-9.
28. Id. at 345, 175 P.2d at 551.
29. Id. at 340, 175 P.2d at 548.
30. Id. at 339, 175 P.2d at 547.
31. This may be a cynical view of democratic government in our state,
but the attempt here is to establish some fundamental rights in property
which may be asserted against government police power.
32. Cal. Gov. Code §§ 65500 and 65503 (West 1969).
33. Id.; see People's Lobby, Inc. v. Board of Sup'rs of Santa Cruz
County, 30 Cal. App. 3d 869, 106 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1973).
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before his property may be subjected to the police power. How-
ever, the California Supreme Court has recently ruled that notice
and hearing requirements do not apply where the property is re-
zoned by a ballot initiative and not by the legislative branch of
the government. 34 But the right to a fair hearing is not the same
as a right to a fair result from such hearing. The government is
required to grant a hearing, it is not required to listen and weigh
the evidence. In practical politics with the scope of the police
power as broad as it is, the property owner's probable injury will
fall on deaf ears when the majority of the voters assert their desire
to restrict the use of that owner's property.3 5 The distinction must
be drawn between a fair hearing which meets due process require-
ments for legislative bodies, and a fair use of regulatory power.
There does not appear to be any requirement of fairness or equity
in defining the scope of the police power. The courts have instead
viewed the problem by looking at the validity of the police power
and the scope of it, and they have not permitted their own judg-
ment to interfere unless vested rights have actually been injured
or the exercise of the police power is totally irrational or unreason-
able.
It should be noted that the police power as defined here is the
legislative power used by local and state governments. When the
power is used by a government agency in a hearing then there is
a different standard of review and a different type of proceeding
required. The California Supreme Court has recently ruled unani-
mously that where variances are granted by a zoning agency, "...
that variance boards like the ones involved in the present case
must render findings to support their ultimate rulings [,and] ...
that when called upon to scrutinize a grant of a variance a reviewing
court must determine whether substantial evidence supports the
findings of the administrative board and whether the findings sup-
port the board's action. '36 Thus in an administrative board action
34. San Diego Building Contractors Ass'n v. City Council of San Diego,
13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974).
35. Again the author's cynicism may be unfounded as to government
functions, but majority rule is part of our democratic system, and those who
are in the greatest number and are most vocal usually rule at such hear-
ings.
36. Topanga Association For a Scenic Community v. County of Los
Angeles, 11 Cal.3d 506, 509-10, 522 P.2d, 12, 13-14, 113 Cal.Rptr. 836, 837(1974).
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a record is required, but the court carefully avoided deciding that
a "fundamental vested right" was involved which would allow "an
independent judgment in reviewing the evidence"8 7 by the court
where it " . . . must find abuse of discretion if the weight of the
evidence fails to support the findings."8 8 Thus although the effect
of a variance and a rezoning may be the same, the method by which
it is accomplished determines whether a record is required and
what the scope of judicial review will be.
The problem of the use of the police power has perplexed many
commentators. In trying to explain the use of police power Profes-
sor Sax89 distinguishes the difference between eminent domain and
the police power by dividing the functions of government into two
categories. One function is the enterprize capacity which " . . . de-
scribes the economic function of providing for and maintaining the
material plant .- 40 The other function is as an arbiter, which de-
fines ". . . standards to reconcile differences among private inter-
ests in the community."'41 He redefines the concepts of taking and
regulation because he believes that the courts do not recognize a
coherent distinction.
Destruction of recognized economic interests, on the ground that
there is no property interest, is so widespread and -pervasive that
the policy of preventing individual economic loss as such can
hardly be said to have been given significant recognition by the
courts. 4
2
The redefinition is not based on whether interests are actually
taken, rather it is based on the function which the government
serves when it takes interests.
The rule proposed is that when economic loss is incurred as a re-
sult of government enhancement of its resource position in its
enterprize capacity, then compensation is constitutionally re-
quired; it is that result which is to be characterized as taking.
But losses, however severe, incurred as a consequence of govern-
ment acting merely in its arbitral capacity are to be viewed as
a noncompensable exercise of the police power. 43
Sax's redefinition may bring some consistency to the distinction be-
tween police power and eminent domain as determined by the
37. Id. at 510, Note 1, 522 P.2d at 14, 113 Cal.Rptr. at 837.
38. Id. at 510, Note 1, 522 P.2d at 14, 113 Cal.Rptr. at 837.
... Abuse of discretion as a standard of review and the Substantial Evi-
dence Test as a standard of review would seem different but here the court
indicates that they are the same.
39. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J. 36 (1964).
40. Id. at 62.
41. Id. at 63.
42. Id. at 53.
43. Id. at 63.
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courts, but it does little to bring a concept of fairness into the exer-
cise of government power. It can only be concluded that the ability
of the individual property owner to contest the scope and validity
of the exercise of government power is minimal. It would seem
further that the government when acting in an arbitral capacity
should consider the preservation of property uses and values, but
such action is not considered by Sax.
A better test is that proposed by Professor Van Alstyne,44 a ra-
tional nexus test.
This rational nexus test postulates a strong presumption of
the validity of zoning regulations, and imposes upon the party at-
tacking a restriction the burden of showing that the regulation, as
applied to his property, constitutes an arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of the police power. It assumes the existence of identi-
fiable factual criteria capable of judicial assessment in considering
whether a particular land use regulation has been rationally ap-
plied; and it further assumes that the process of organizing a com-
munity land use plan and use zones is not so highly discretionary
as to insulate it from effective judicial review. Finally, the ra-
tional basis test accepts judicial responsibility for evaluating the
reasonableness of a regulation, as applied, in light of all the sur-
rounding circumstances, including the nature and use of the subject
property and of surrounding properties, trends in the land develop-
ment pattern in the community, suitability of the affected prop-
erty for uses permitted by the regulation, impact of the regulation
uponthe value of the property, practicability of less drastic restric-
tions, and the extent to which enforcement of the regulatory
scheme tends to promote legitimate planning purposes.45
Such a test would serve the desired purpose of removing the pres-
ent "some logical basis test," and redefining reasonableness and
arbitrariness to a court reviewable standard which balances the in-
terests of private property use against the needs of the public. Such
a test might lead to a definition of property interests which would
include a right to use property. Even now there exists in property
ownership the right to the use of it when enough conduct is under-
taken by the owner.
b) The Vested Right to Use Property Which May be Taken.
The Restatement of Property defines, "The word 'interest' is used
44. Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power; The Search for
Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1971).
45. Id., at 28; see also Note, Zoning: Deprivation of All Economic Use
Without Compensation.-Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los An-
geles (Cal. 1962). 50 Cal. L. Rev. 896 (1962).
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in this restatement both generically to include varying aggregates
of rights, privileges, powers and immunities and distributively to
mean any one of them. '40 It further states, "At any one time and
place, however, there is a maximum combination of rights, privi-
leges, powers and immunities in the land that is legally possible,
and which constitutes complete property in land . . .,4 An owner
who has purchased real property subject to a comprehensive zon-
ing regulation would presumably believe that he had an interest
in it to the maximum legal use under such regulation. But the
courts have not viewed the situation with as much logic. Rather
they have held, "It is settled that a property owner acquires no
vested right, as against future zoning, merely by purchasing real
property, '48 or even " . . . by purchasing property in reliance on
the existing zoning and thereafter making certain endeavors to de-
velop it for a specified use. '49
The courts have avoided establishing or creating a right to use
property. It appears that such a right is non-existent until it is
exercised. The logic for denying the owner a vested right in the
use of his property is based on the presumption of the validity of
zoning laws, the courts' construction of the scope of the police
power, and the avoidance by the courts of expanding the scope of
eminent domain power.
The procedure and scope of eminent domain proceedings are set
forth in the Code of Civil Procedure in California."0 It is defined
as "the right of the people or government to take private property
for public use."51 There is an expansive definition of "public use"
which includes "all other public uses authorized by the government
of the United States,' '5 2 "all other public uses authorized by the
Legislature of the State of California, 53 and "all other public uses
for the benefit of any county, incorporated city, or city and county,
village or town, or the inhabitants thereof, which may be author-
ized by the Legislature. '5 4 The government may take "all real
property belonging to any person"5 5 but the limitation on the tak-
ing of property is "that the use to which it is applied is a use
46. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 5 (1936).
47. Id. at § 5, comment (e).
48. Anderson v. City Council, 229 Cal.App.2d 79, 88, 40 Cal.Rptr. 41,
47 (1964).
49. Id. at 90, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
50. Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. §§ 1237 to 1273.06 ('West 1973).
51. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1237.
52. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1238(1).
53. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1238(2).
54. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1238(3).
55. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1240(1).
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authorized by law,"56 and "that the taking is necessary to such
use. ' 57 It is further required that local governments or agencies,
* * * by resolution or ordinance, adopted by vote of two-thirds of
all its members, have found and determined that the public inter-
est and necessity require the acquisition, construction or comple-
tion... such resolution shall be conclusive evidence; (a) of the
public necessity of such proposed public utility or public improve-
ment; (b) that such property is necessary therefor, and (c) that
such proposed public utility or public improvement is planned or
located in the manner which will be most compatible with the
greatest public good, and the least private injury.58
The standards for eminent domain are thus quite different than
those for the exercise of police power. Public necessity is the justi-
fication for taking,59 whereas property may be regulated for more
intangible reasons such as health, safety, and the general welfare.
If the owner of land must give up an interest in his property by
eminent domain for public necessity, and the government fails to
initiate condemnation proceedings against him:
• . . the owner of a parcel may bring an action in inverse con-
demnation requiring the taking of such parcel and a determina-
tion of the fair market value payable as just compensation for
such taking. In such inverse condemnation action the court
may, in addition, or in the alternative, if it finds that the rights
of the owner have been interfered with, award damages for
any such interference by the public entity.60
In determining the value of property in a condemnation action both
"the highest and best use of the property" and "the applicable zon-
ing and the opinion of the witness as to the probability of any
change in such zoning"6' are given great weight.
One would think that the use of land is an interest in land which
would be subject to the power of eminent domain. Land ownership
is very important in our society. Its use is a major factor in deter-
mining its value. Why is the owner left without a court remedy
56. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1241(1).
57. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1241(2).
58. Id. at § 1241 subdiv. 2, no such two thirds majority requirement is
imposed on zoning and planning, Cal. Gov. Code § 65503 (1969).
59. The conclusiveness of the necessity as determined by the govern-
ment entity may not be subject to review. Los Angeles v. Bartlett, 203 Cal.
App. 2d 523, 21 Cal. Rptr. 776 (1962). But the standard is nevertheless con-
siderably more rigid.
60. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §1243.1.
01. Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 1272.02(b) (3) and (4).
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for the taking of the use of land? The answer is the courts' vested
rights theory.
In order to state a cause of action for inverse condemnation, there
must be an invasion or appropriation of some valuable property
right which the landowner possesses and the invasion or appropri-
ation must directly and specially affect the landowner to his in-
jury.62
Zoning regulations are not contracts by the city and may therefore
be modified by the latter. Property is always held subject to the
valid exercise of police power. The theory of vested rights relates
only to such rights as an owner may possess not to have his prop-
erty rezoned after he has started construction thereon or was mak-
ing use thereof permitted by law when such construction or use
does not constitute a nuisance.63
The right to use property is thus not a right ordinarily found in
the law, which may be intelligently waived or which may be in-
vaded only with the consent of the right holder. Rather it is a
right which arises out of the lawful use of land in fact by the owner
with the consent of government, and is nonexistent unless it is exer-
cised in fact. Such a right is very elusive when it is considered
that the only reasons for property ownership, or at least the major
interest in it, is the use to which it can be put. Vested rights are
protected from legislative interference, and property ownership is
a definite vested constitutional right, but this right is emasculated
when the right to use is not likewise protected. The elusiveness
of the right has led one commentator to this conclusion:
There is some incongruity in a device that destroys hundreds of
thousands of dollars of vacant land value, while preserving from
destruction the value, for example, of a non-conforming neighbor-
hood delicatessen. 64
It would seem that compensation should be awarded whenever a
special damage can be shown.65
A case of maj or importance on this issue of inverse condemnation
is now before the California Supreme Court. In H.F.H., LTD v.
Superior Court and Von's Grocery v. Superior Court,6  the parties
bought property in reliance on the C-2 zoning for development as
a shopping center in the City of Cerritos. Eventually the city, af-
ter declaring a moritorium with respect to the use of certain prop-
62. Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal.3d 110, 119-
20, 514 P.2d 111, 117, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799, 805 (1973).
63. Wheeler v. Gregg, 90 Cal. App. 2d 348, 365, 203 P.2d 37, 48 (1949).
64. Kratovil and Harrison, Eminent Domain: Policy and Concept. 42
Cal. L. Rev. 596, 629 (1954).
65. It. at 635.
66. 41 Cal. App. 3d 908, 116 Cal. Rptr. 436 (1974).
... Contra for another recent case as to inverse condemnation for down-
zoning, see Gisler v. County of Marin, 48 Cal. App. 3d 303, 112 Cal. Rptr.
919 (1972).
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erty zone categories including the petitioners', rezoned the property
to low-density, single family residential while retaining the com-
mercial zoning for other similarly situated property. The Califor-
nia District Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, held, on the granting
of demurrers by the trial court to the city, that such an action by
the city stated a cause of action in inverse condemnation.
The city under such circumstances must be put to its proof in justi-
fying such action and demonstrating that a property owner is not
being unfairly burdened with the cost of improving the public wel-
fare which in justice ought to be borne by the public. 67
The alleged loss of the land value to the petitioners was $325,000,
and the court said:
In principle, the hardship resulting from loss of investment by pur-
chasing property in reliance on an existing zoning classification
seems no less devastating than a hardship resulting from loss
of investment in actually making use of the property. 68
The appeals Court did not hold that the petitioners had a vested
right in the use of property as discussed herein, although it did
consider the argument. Rather, it felt that the loss was so substan-
tial that the burden on the petitioners was unfair and thus should
state a cause of action in inverse condemnation. The California
Supreme Court has vacated the decision pending the appeal in
which many cities and counties have filed amicus curiae briefs.
Whether this decision will ultimately change the concept of vested
rights in land use, will expand the definition of arbitrary and dis-
criminatory police power in zoning, or will fall into line with the
older decisions expanding the police power is unclear.
But the trend is clear, the vested right has further eroded in the
past few years, and with the exception of one case concerning
vested rights against the Coastal Zone Conservation Act69 has
been fairly consistent. The exception was where a builder had "not
only obtained a building permit but also engaged in substantial law-
ful work and incurred substantial liabilities."70  He was held to
have obtained a vested right as against the requirement of obtain-
ing a permit from the San Diego Coast Regional Commission. But
67. Id. at 919, 116 Cal.Rptr. at 444.
68. Id. at 920, 116 Cal.Rptr. at 444.
69. See, supra note 4.
70. San Diego Coast Regional Com'n v. See the Sea, Ltd., 9 Cal.3d 888,
892-93, 513 P.2d 129, 132, 109 Cal.Rptr. 377, 380, (1973); see also, vested
rights defined in Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 27404 (West 1973).
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this case, San Diego Coast Regional Commission v. See the Sea, Ltd.,
will be easy to limit to its facts as it may only apply to the Coastal
Zone Conservation Act and only to the time between the adoption
of the Act and its becoming effective. In See the Sea Justice Mosk
dissented and gave the prevailing rule:
The rule long established in this state and in most jurisdictions is
that the mere acquisition of a building permit affords a builder no
protection against a change in the zoning laws adopted after its is-
suance and that in order to continue the construction of a project
initiated prior to a change in the law, a builder must have obtained
a vested right by making substantial expenditures for construction
in good faith reliance on the permit prior to the effective date
of the new law.71
An example of insufficient "substantial work in reliance" on a per-
mit to have a right vest is the grading of lots for development un-
der a grading permit before the changed zoning law made building
the planned multiple dwelling units unlawful.72 On the other hand
$2,300 work done on a permit to build has been held enough to
vest a right to complete the building.7 3 However, in a recent case
7 4
$21,000 spent in reliance on a permit and over two years of using
the premises under the permit was held not enough to vest a right
to estop the city from denying the use, because the permit was
found to have been granted in violation of a zoning ordinance. The
rationale for the denial of the previously granted use was:
In the area of permits and zoning laws . . . the courts have ex-
pressly or by necessary implication consistently concluded that the
public and community interest in preserving the community pat-
terns established by zoning laws outweighs the injustice that may
71. Id., at 894, 513 P.2d at 1323, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 381-2.
72. Spindler Realty Co. v. Monning, 243 Cal.App.2d 255, 53 Cal.Rptr.
7 (1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 975 (1966).
... But see Environmental Coalition of Orange County v. AVCO Com-
munity Developers, Inc. 40 Cal. App. 3d 513, 115 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1974), Cali-
fornia Central Coast Regional Coastal Conservation Commission v. McKeon
Construction Co., 38 Cal. App. 3d 154, 112 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1974), and
Transcentuty Properties Inc. v. State, 41 Cal.App.3d 835, 116 Cal.Rptr.
487 (1974) which define vested rights in the California Coastal Zone Con-
servation Act of 1972 differently than Spindler at least as to developments
on which substantial work including grading, procuring Subdivision Maps,
and obtaining Planning Commission approval of projects has been com-
menced. But these vested rights are an exemption from the requirement
of obtaining a permit from the Commission as in See the Sea, Ltd., supra,
note 70.
73. Kissinger v. Los Angeles, 161 Cal. App. 2d 454, 463, 327 P.2d 10, 16
(1958). (There was an additional element of bad faith by government in
this case.)
74. Pettit v. City of Fresno, 34 Cal.App.3d 813, 110 Cal.Rptr. 262
(1973); how an owner is to know whether a permit violates zoning laws
when he has been granted a permit for a variance or non-conforming use
is difficult to understand. See also, Millbrae Ass'n for Residential Survival
v. City of Millbrae, 262 Cal. App. 2d 222, 69 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1968).
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be incurred by the individual in relying upon an invalid permit to
build issued in violation of zoning laws.75
As limited as the right has become it may now be lost. It appears
that a vested right to use property may be divested by time and
one's own accounting methods. In National Advertising Co. v.
County of Monterey76 the court held that an outdoor advertiser
had a vested right to use his signs which were not fully amortized,
but that those signs which had been fully amortized retained no
such right for the owner. It further held that the county could
compel the removal of the other signs at the owner's own expense
if a reasonable time for amortization was given "commensurate
with the investment involved. '77
Extending this premise, an owner may buy property under a com-
prehensive zoning plan, and have no vested right to the present
zoning. He may then build in compliance with the zoning regula-
tions and acquire a vested right not to have his property rezoned
unless compensation is paid for the loss of his use. But, the gov-
ernment may rezone his property and grant him a non-conforming
use. Then it may eliminate the non-conforming use and compel
the owner to remove the structure at his own cost without having
to pay compensation if a reasonable time is given to amortize the
use. Such a result may benefit society, but it certainly does not
seem fair.
Under such an extention of the above rule, if the regulatory body
is patient enough, it may virtually never need to use an eminent
domain proceeding. Even if the logic of the result might be ap-
pealing in the case of outdoor advertising signs, it would be quite
absurd if applied to a large commercial building that was rezoned
to agricultural use or residential use. But, there would be no
vested right!
Consider one more abuse of the police power. A city may deny
a building permit to a landowner because it has planned to put
a street on his property, and the planned building interferes with
the planned street. The owner had refused to dedicate the street
to the city, and alleged that the refusal of the permit was a taking
75. Id. at 820, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 266.
76. 1 Cal. 3d 875, 464 P.2d 33, 83 Cal.Rptr. 577 (1970), cert. denied 398
U.S. 946 (1970).
77. Id. at 879, 464 P.2d at 35, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
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of his property. The California Supreme Court held, "that the en-
actment of a general plan for future development of an area, indi-
cating potential public uses of privately owned land .. . [is not]
.. .inverse condemnation of that land,"78 and that "a governmental
body may require dedication of property as a condition for its de-
velopment. '79 Such a decision amounts to the proposition that the
government may refuse to allow a lawful use of property, but it
does not have to take it, it only has to contemplate taking it.
But in a recent decision"0 it was held that an unreasonable delay
in bringing a condemnation action stated a cause of action for dam-
ages in inverse condemnation for the loss of value because of the
pending proceedings. The two decisions are difficult to reconcile.
Many of the police power decisions arise out of the policy that
.. the objective of zoning [is] to eliminate non-conforming uses
' ..,"81 But it is common knowledge that whenever property is de-
veloped a builder will seek either a non-conforming use or a vari-
ance to increase his use. The policy of eliminating non-conforming
uses has not really been effective. Further the criteria for the
granting of the permits with non-conforming uses or variances is
often substantially affected by the amount of public attention that
the development and the hearings receive.
Although the above survey is not a complete history of the evolu-
tion of the conflict between the powers of eminent domain and reg-
ulation of land use, it does show the dominance of the regulatory
police power and the elusiveness of the vested right to use prop-
78. Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal.3d 110, 119,
514 P.2d 111, 116, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799, 804 (1973).
79. Id. at 119, 514 P.2d at 117, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 804, see Associated Home
Builders, etc. Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94
Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971). But see, Southern Pacific Co. v. City of Los Angeles,
242 Cal.App.2d 38, 51 Cal.Rptr. 197 (1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 647(1967), where a requirement to dedicate a street in order to receive a build-
ing permit was held a taking, because the builder did not seek to expand
his use beyond the permissible use under the regulation.
80. Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal.3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1972).
81. County of San Diego v. McClurken, 37 Cal.2d 683, 687, 234 P.2d 972,
975 (1951). See also, Rehfeld v. City and County of San Francisco, 218
Cal. 83, 84, 21 P.2d 419, 420 (1933).
82. For a more in depth study see: Kravotil and Harrison, Eminent Do-
main-Policy and Concept, 42 Cal. L. Rev. 596 (1954), Sax, Takings and
the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J. 36 (1964), Van Alstyne, Modernizing Inverse
Condemnation: A Legislative Prospectus, 8 Santa Clara Law. 1 (1967), Van
Alstyne, Statutory Modification of Inverse Condemnation: the Scope
of Legislative Power, 19 Stan. L. Rev. 727 (1967), Heyman and Gilhool, The
Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community Cost on New Sub-
urban Residents through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119 (1964),
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erty. 2 There should be a re-evaluation of the right to use property,
and a curtailing of the police power to take it.
THmF OUGHT To BE A RIGHT
The California Supreme court has said, "Damage caused by the
proper exercise of police power is merely one of the prices an in-
dividual must pay as a member of society. '8 3 There can be no
doubt that the power to regulate land use is an important and nec-
essary government function, which is essential to the orderly devel-
opment of a community. But it also seems obvious that the power
of regulation in its present form is unfair. When a community has
developed a general plan and has zoned the area in accordance with
that plan, the individual owner of zoned property ought to be able
to rely on the use that has been granted by the government. When
a city decides to change its plans, it should then "socialize the bur-
den of loss - to afford relief to the landowner in cases in which
it is unfair to ask him to bear a burden that should be assumed
by society. 8s4 If such a burden is not shared by all those who bene-
fit, then the doctrine of caveat emptor which is now dwindling as
a real property conveyances doctrine, will arise anew not as be-
tween buyers and sellers, but as between either of them and the
state. In fact it is now common practice for developers to buy land
contingent on the approval of a zoning change. Under present cir-
cumstances raising the issue of zoning may cause the area planning
to be reconsidered and may cause the land to be down-zoned instead
of upzoned when the prospect of development is brought to the
attention of the zoning authorities and the public.
One state court has viewed the situation more sanely, "If the gain
to the public is small, from rezoning real estate, and the hardship
to the owner is great, no valid reason exists for the exercise of such
Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation: The Constitutional Limits of Public
Responsibility, 1966 Wis L. Rev. 1.
83. Reynolds v. Barret, 12 Cal.2d 244, 250, 83 P.2d 29, 32 (1938) ...
see Bosselmon, Callies, & Banta, The Taking Issue (1973) (U.S.G.P.O.) for
strong support of this position and a denial of a vested right to use land.
84. Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation: The Constitutional Limits of
Public Responsibility, 1966 Wis. L. Rev. 1, 8. See, Bacich v. Board of Con-
'trol, 23 Cal.2d 343, 350, 144 P.2d 818, 823 (1943) ". . . the policy underly-
ing the eminent domain provision in the Constitution is to distribute
throughout the community the loss inflicted upon the individual by the
making of public improvements..
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police power."8 5 Some California courts have given credence to the
concept, when they have avoided or overcome the vested rights
problem:
In short the ordinance arbitrarily rezoned plaintiff's property
to a use to which it could not economically be put, lying as it
does between multiple dwelling development and commercial
development and discriminates against the plaintiffs by pre-
venting the use of their property for the use for which it is best
fitted, while permitting all other property similarly situated
zoned to be used as R-3 property.80
A zoning ordinance may not be used as a device to take property
for public use without payment of compensation.8 7
The problem has become the definition of the vested right, and
when it vests. Without the vested right the owner has not only
no right to compensation, but no right to complain.
Excluding the control and regulation of nuisances, 88 regulations
should be divided into two categories. First, those regulations
which benefit society and the property owner as well. These are
such regulations as fire protection regulations, reasonable off-street
parking requirements, pest control regulations, and other similar
types of regulation. The results of such regulations is the mutual
benefit to society and the owner, and any compromise of the use
of property bears some equivalency to the benefit received for the
owner's health, safety, and general welfare. These regulations are
what the layman would consider to be valid exercises of police
power. Further, the layman would be unlikely to feel an interest
in his property had been taken or damaged by the exercise of this
police power. This type of regulation should be left unchanged.
The second type of regulation is that which when exercised is
of little or no benefit to the owner, but the use of his land is re-
stricted for the benefit of society at large. This type of regulation
generally involves policy changes in a planned area. If the policy
as to the growth of an area is changed so as to lessen the intensity
85. Langguth v. Village of Mount Pleasant, 5 Ill.2d 49, 52, 124 N.E.2d
879, 880 (1955).
86. Kissinger v. Los Angeles, 161 Cal.App.2d 454, 462-63, 327 P.2d 10,
16 (1957); see also, Skalko v. City of Sunnyvale, 14 Cal.2d 213, 93 P.2d
93 (1939).
87. Id. at 462, 327 P.2d at 16, citing Dobbins v. City of Los Angeles, 195
U.S. 223 (1904).
88. "The Legislature may declare a pre-existing use to be a public nui-
sance and may forbid it without providing an amortization period." People,
Dept. of Public Works v. ADCO Advertisers, 35 Cal.App.3d 507, 513, 110
Cal. Rptr. 849, 853 (1973); see, City of Escondido v. Desert Outdoor Adver-
tising, Inc., 8 Cal.3d 785, 505 P.2d 1012, 106 Cal.Rptr. 172, (1973), Living-
ston Rock etc., Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 43 Cal.2d 121, 272 P.2d 4
(1954).
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of land use or the population, the burden should not fall on some
property owners for the benefit of all society. Although zoning
law in its present status would allow the government to take as
much as it can without having to give compensation, it does not
seem fair in light of the policy considerations of eminent domain
to allow it to do so. The use of such regulations involves social
engineering or land use planning for which the owner of vacant
property subject to rezoning or down-zoning bears the whole eco-
nomic burden. It is contrary to the concept of socializing the bur-
den which is contemplated in eminent domain, but unless the law is
changed there will be no compensation for the exercise of this type
of police power.
In City of Long Beach v. Mansell,89 the California Supreme Court
held:
- [T]he government may be bound by an equitable estoppel in
the same manner as a private party when the elements requisite to
such an estoppel against a private party are present and, in the
considered view of a court of equity, the injustice which would
result from a failure to uphold an estoppel is of sufficient dimen-
sion to justify any effect upon the public interest or policy which
would result from the raising of an estoppel.9 0
If the owner of property had some right to assert in reliance on
the existing zoning, then such an estoppel would be beneficial to
him. But as the cases have indicated, there is no such right, because
such a right does not vest until property is developed with a permit
under the zoning law, and then it may be divested if a reasonable
amortization period is given by the regulatory entity. But if the
value of property lost due to pre-condemnation announcements and
excessive delay in bringing condemnation proceedings is not too
speculative to state a cause of action for damages in inverse con-
demnation,91 why should not an action for inverse condemnation
lie for the rezoning or down-zoning of property? Is the damage
any less ascertainable? The present policy which only grants a
vested right when the property is actually developed encourages
rapid development in a haphazard fashion because the property
89. 3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal.Rptr. 23 (1970).
90. Id. at 496-97, 476 P.2d at 448, 91 Cal. Rptr at 48.
91. Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal.3d 29, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1972), distinguished in Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaven-
tura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 119, 514 P.2d 111, 116, 104 Cal. Rptr. 799, 804 (1973).
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owner must develop in an unstable zoning situation to preserve his
use.
It is proposed that once a community has decided upon a compre-
hensive general plan and has zoned in accordance with said plan,
that a right to the use allowed each parcel ought to vest 92 regardless
of the conduct of the property owner. Thereafter if a variance or
non-conforming use is requested by the owner from the govern-
ment, it could grant or deny it under the present standards of issu-
ing such uses. However, if the use increases the fair market value
of the property, the owner would be required to pay the govern-
ment the fair market value of the increased use.
This rule would make the zoning laws consistent with the prop-
erty tax laws in California. 93 Because the use of property would
be well defined and easier to evaluate, assessment for taxation
would be more fair and consistent.
The proposed rule would balance the burden of social engineering
by local governments among all the citizens who benefit by creat-
ing a right which when taken or damaged is subject to eminent
domain power compensation. It would thus remove the standard
of "some logical basis" for the legislative exercise of police power
of this type, and substitute a standard of "public necessity for the
public welfare." It would weigh a vested right on the part of the
property owner against the benefit which society is to receive for
the change in the zoning laws. It would bring the law up to the
expectations of the property owner by creating something of legally
recognizable value in the use of property.
The proposed rule would create some stability in planning. The
vested right to use property would be well defined. Planners
would be circumspect in the initial zoning of property, and builders
would not be tempted to plan on the expectancy of receiving a
greater use than the existing zoning permits on the grounds that
92. This right is strongly supported by Professor Donald G. Hagman of
the U.C.L.A. Law School in his Windfall-Wipeout theory advocated in his
address at the Pepperdine University School of Law, Land Use Planning
and Control Symposium, January 18, 1975.
93. Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code §§ 401, 402.1 (West 1973). See, A.F. Gilmore
Co. v. Los Angeles, 186 Cal. App. 2d 471, 9 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1961); Wild Goose
Country Club v. Butte County, 60 Cal. App. 334, 212 P. 711 (1923) (concern-
ing present and future use as a factor in valuation for tax assessment pur-
poses).
§ 402.1 states in part, "there shall be a rebuttable presumption that re-
strictions will not be removed or substantially modified in the predictable
future and that they substantially equate the value of the land to the value
attributable to the legally permissible use or uses."
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they desired to use the property in a novel way, or that they would
bring business to the community.
The proposed rule would eliminate the inherent discrimination
between those who have built on their property and those who have
not. Every owner would be able to plan the use of his land in
accordance with his right. When a change in policy might occur,
owners would not be tempted to throw together any plan and start
building to prevent the loss of their right to construct under the
existing zoning.94 Instead if the policy changed and the property
was down-zoned, the owner would be compensated for his economic
loss.
Under the proposed rule the will of the majority in planning
would be socialized so that if a policy change in the growth or pop-
ulation of a local community were contemplated, the minority
would not have to suffer a non-compensable loss for the benefit
of the majority who do not hold property subject to the change.
The tax dollar would be applied to recompense the losses of those
injured, and the majority would pay for the benefit that they are
to receive. Similarly if the value of property was to be enhanced
by an increased use of land, the owner would have to recompense
the majority through the payment of money for the benefit he re-
ceives. Thus the burden of change would be equably applied to
all those who benefit or suffer.
The granting of variances and non-conforming uses would be less
abused by developers, because the standard for upgrading the per-
missible use of property would be the necessity standard used in
eminent domain, and this has been accomplished in part by the re-
cent requirement of a factual record and a substantial evidence test
in review of agency or board decisions for variances.9 4 With such
a right to use clearly defined the procedure would be to "reverse
condemn" the property if the public needed a greater use in land.
Also, developers would tend less to use influence and cajolery with
local planners in order to get favors with regard to future use.
Property values and growth would be better controlled under the
proposed rule because the owners would not tend to speculate on
94. See Mosk, J. dissenting, San Diego Coast Regional Com'n v. See the
Sea, Ltd., 9 Cal.3d 888, 892, 894, 513 P.2d 129, 132, 109 Cal.Rptr. 377, 381(1973).
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the future conduct of government with regard to property use, since
necessity and cost would be involved in the change of use, and not
speculation as to the whims of local government.
Much of the controversy about the reasonableness of the exercise
of police power and when the right to complain vests would be
settled. The problems of unfairness to individuals would diminish.
the legal use of property would become a right of privilege inci-
dent to ownership, that would not change.
The proposed rule would make the legal use of property a sort
of contract between the owner and the government 5 Where the
government represents the people and the public interest, and the
property owner holds his right to use his property and can rely
on that right, the ends of zoning and the rights of individuals are
best served. Alternatively, the zoning of use could be viewed as
a license to use which could only be revoked or revised with com-
pensation.
The rule would revive the distinction between the taking or dam-
aging of property and the regulation of it. It would place prop-
erty ownership back on a reasonable basis, because the value of
property would be determined not only by its location and size,
but also the actual use to which it could be legally put.
The power to regulate would not be diminished by the creation
of such a right because it is assumed that the rights arise out of
a comprehensive zoning plan. Rather it compels government to be
fair to the owner once his right is established. It does not usurp
the police power, rather it requires that it be consistent and equit-
able. It compels the government to be fair with the owner once
police power regulation has been applied.
It should be noted that the theory of vested rights has largely
been created by the courts.96 Thus the courts can change the law
with regard to them. Most of this comment has been devoted to
the unfairness of the present law as regards to the injury to individ-
uals. The proposed rule would certainly cure much of that unfair-
ness. If, as Professor Van Alstyne97 proposed, the present system
does not give the courts enough leeway in testing the reasonable-
ness of the regulatory power, the placing of a right to use, which
vests on the determination of a comprehensive plan, would increase
95. Topanga Association for A Scenic Community v. County of Los
Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d 506, 522 P.2d 12, 113 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1974).
96. See, supra, note 60.
97. See, Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 27404, (West -) defining a vested right
for the purposes of the Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972, which is
essentially the court created definition.
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the reasonableness of changes in regulation, and would not require
second guessing the discretion of local government by the judi-
ciary. Such a right would also eliminate the problem of trying to
determine which function government is trying to assert in the
taking of property as proposed by Professor Sax 5
There are two logical ways to create such a right. Either to
create the right by implication which may be the subject of an
estoppel against the government as in Mansell,"° which is essen-
tially the reliance on zoning argument used in the HFH, LTD10
case, or define rezoning or down-zoning of property as a taking of
a vested property right to use for public use by statute.10 2 Either
method would create the stability of land use and land use plan-
ning that should be desired by local communities.
Although there would be some administrative problems in creat-
ing such a right out of the present wasteland in which the law
stands, the stability which would result, and the inherent fairness
that should result, would far outweigh problems that would arise
during the transition. Without such a right property ownership
may soon become meaningless, since the owner will become the
slave of government in the use of his property.
*HUGH BRECKENRIDGE
98. See supra, notes 44 and 45.
99. See supra, notes 38, 39, 40, 41, and 42.
100. See supra, Mansell, notes 89 and 90.
Mansell has recently been used as authority to estop a county from
denying the validity of a use permit for use of the property as a
mobile home park where the owner-plaintiff had relied on the
permit in purchasing the land, receiving a grading permit, receiv-
ing approval of construction plans, and receiving approval of
sewer hookups. Strong v. County of Santa Cruz, 1 Civil 33481
(D.C.A. 1st Dist. California filed February 18, 1975).
L.A. Daily Journal App. Report 3-25-75 at p. 34.
101. 41 Cal. App. 3d 908, 116 Cal. Rptr. 436 (1974).
102. See supra, notes 54, 55, and 56.
* Hugh Breckenridge is a third year student and a member of the Law
Review staff. A.B. Stanford University.
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